Literature Review: What the Historians Say

About the Conspirators

A common historical view argues that Caesar’s assassins had a lack of foresight and failed to gain control of Roman political power after killing Caesar. They believed ideologically that the republic was a form of government that all Romans supported and that it could simply return once Caesar was dead. They misjudged the opinion of the people; the ordinary Romans reacted with anger, putting an end to the conspirators’ plans to immediately restore the republic. A major aspect of this argument is the common underlying assumption that Caesar was popular among the common people of Rome and that anger over his death was a widespread phenomenon[1].

About Mark Antony and Octavian

Historians who examine Mark Antony’s conciliatory agreement with the senate concluded that his policies temporarily acted as a continuation of Roman republican government. In this view, the fall of the republic occurred because Antony and the senate could not maintain this agreement; if Antony had managed to do so, he could have easily defeated Octavian in the political arena[2]. Other historians emphasize the role of Octavian, blaming his disruption of Antony’s power base as the reason behind the rift with the senate, as Antony was forced to move more aggressively to maintain power[3].

About Cicero

A different take on Octavian examines his political dealings with the senate and one of its major leaders, Cicero. Cicero is frequently blamed for his single-minded focus on defeating Antony and possible ignorance of Octavian’s goals; his attempts to raise Caesar’s heir as a champion of the republic backfired when Octavian betrayed the senate and allied himself with Antony[4].

About the Optimates and Populares

A more general view frames the conflict after Caesar’s death as a continuation of a decades-long struggle between two factions, known as the optimates and populares. The optimates, or “the best men”, favored the political power of the senate and the dominant role of the aristocracy. The populares claimed to be leaders of the people and used the popular branches of government to either reform or advance their own power by circumventing senatorial power. In this view, “defending the republic” meant maintaining senatorial authority over the Roman oligarchy, a system that in truth  contained few democratic elements. The optimatesbelieved in the “freedom” to rise through the political system without the domineering influence of any one individual, such as Caesar. The dictator had risen to power using the methods of the populares, which both Octavian and

Map detailing the rapid expansion of the Roman Republic

Antony continued to use after Caesar’s death. The end of the republic is viewed as a result of a natural conflict between Roman governmental branches and of the senate’s failure to maintain its authority[5]. This view asserts that the rapid growth of the Roman civilization led to strains on the republic that ultimately led to a collapse of Roman political structures[6].

My View of the Issue

At the time of Caesar’s death, the Roman Republic was undergoing a period of upheaval and turmoil. After decades of civil war, violence, economic issues, and a weakening of its political systems, the republic reached a tipping point with the assassination of Caesar. The large issues of Roman expansion, the historical context of previous conflicts, or the struggle within the Roman branches of government are out of the scope of this website. It will instead examine one of the specific issues in the period after Caesar’s death, namely the role played by Octavian. The political maneuvers of Octavian allowed him to consolidate power through his claims to Caesar’s legitimacy and power, forcing his opponent Mark Antony into a confrontation with the senate. When shifts in the balance of power occurred, Octavian found opportunities to maintain momentum through the formation and dissolution of political alliances. With these tactics, Octavian rose to power and created an authoritarian system that ultimately led to the end of the Roman Republic.


[1] Cady and Scullard 283, Everitt 56, Shotter 86-8, and Syme 97-101, 119-20. See also North.

[2] Cady and Scullard 288.

[3] Cady and Scullard 285, Everitt 61-2, and Syme 123.

[4] Obbink and Simon. See also Shotter 89-90 and Syme 143, 181-5.

[5] Shotter 4-9, 27-8, 78-9 and 82-7. See also Badian’s “optimates, populares”, Everitt 19, and North.