Octavian attached himself to the legacy of Caesar to gain a support base, but his next move—the creation of an alliance with the senate to challenge Antony—ensured the continuation of his political momentum and the legitimization of his power.
Political Motivations
As Antony’s legions neared victory in their siege against Decimus Brutus, the governor of Cisalpine Gaul, the senate hoped to regain control of the province on which they relied to protect their interests by using Octavian’s increasingly powerful military force. The senators also wished to widen the rift between Antony and Octavian, preventing the two Caesarian leaders from forming an alliance that might threaten their position.
Cicero, who emerged as a dominant leader in the senate[1], pushed for several decrees that granted Octavian the rank of pro-praetor so that he could now officially command his previously illegal army of veterans. In addition, Octavian was granted entry into the senate, the ability to enter political office ten years before the legal age, and a repayment from the public treasury to compensate Caesar’s heir for the cost incurred by the raising of his forces. Then, along with the new consuls of 43 BC, Hirtius and Pansa, Octavian led a combined army to aid Decimus Brutus and defeat Antony.
Thus, Octavian’s power, beyond its existence within the support base of Caesar’s old followers, became solidified in law[2]. With the creation of this alliance, he now had additional allies in the senate that he could use to defeat Antony, who was viewed as a common enemy of both Octavian and the senate.
Octavian Obtains Legitimization
On some level, the alliance did seem counterintuitive; Octavian had gained support on the idea of avenging Caesar against the assassins, yet he was asking his supporters to help the senate, which generally favored the assassins, protect Decimus Brutus, a conspirator, from Antony, who still retained a significant level of support among Caesar’s soldiers and veterans[3]. Octavian would not have wanted to create this alliance, but several factors led him to do so.
Octavian knew that it would be impossible challenge both Antony and Decimus Brutus simultaneously. Therefore, he decided to ally himself with the senators and their ally Decimus Brutus to ensure that he would only have to face one opponent at a time.
In November of 44 BC, several months before the official formation of the alliance, Octavian had taken a massive gamble, perhaps indicative as some believe of his youth and inexperience: he had taken his illegal army into Rome and occupied the Forum, but failed to gain support for this action, which was essentially a failed military coup. Furthermore, as Octavian planned to move against Antony, many of his supporters felt uneasy about fighting the elected consul and the fellow soldiers under his command. The failed coup and weakening morale of his forces contributed to a weakening of Octavian’s position.
Caesar’s heir did not have imperium—the executive authority needed to command this army. To maintain political power, it made practical sense for Octavian to reach out to a potential area of support within the senate, which allowed him to obtain increased legitimization through his position as pro-praetor—an office that carried imperium—and the legalization of his army[4].
Cicero Manipulated?
It appears that Octavian planned for this political maneuver in advance; while gathering supporters, he kept lines of communication open with Cicero, asking the orator for political advice and urging him to help “save the republic”. It is unclear to what extent Octavian truly swayed Cicero, but it does appear that Cicero gradually changed his view of Caesar’s heir: at first, the orator did not trust Octavian, but later praised and supported him, calling him a “heaven-sent youth” who could help the senate defend the republic.
To some extent, Cicero placed his hopes of a great protector of the republic into Caesar’s heir. It also known that Cicero had often envisioned himself as a wise advisor, who could guide and support a younger, inexperienced champion of the republic. In the end, it is not clear what the relationship between Cicero and Octavian was; some still assert that Cicero planned to abandon Octavian after using him against Antony.
It is possible that Octavian played to Cicero’s republican ideology and political ambitions in order to manipulate the orator, perhaps revealing the extent of Octavian’s skills in the political arena[5]. At the very least, this communication of Octavian with Cicero acted as a pathway that Caesar’s heir later used to create the political alliance with the senate—a strong move that legitimized his power, granted him additional allies he could use to defeat his political enemy, Antony, and shored up potential weaknesses in his political position.
[1] Syme 164 and Everitt 67.
[2] Appian BCiv III.47-51, Everitt 67-9, and Syme 167.
[3] Appian BCiv III.46.
[4] Appian BCiv III.43, Everitt 66-8 and Syme 125.
[5] Appian BCiv III.82, Everitt 62, 68-9, Shotter, 89, 97, and Syme 141-3, 181-3. For more on Cicero, see Obbink and Simon. For primary sources, see Cic. Fam.
Image: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:M._Tullius_Cicero_IMG_2414_B1.jpg