Antony’s Reaction

The Political Strategy of Antony

Statue of Mark Antony

At the time, Antony’s power was dependent on a delicate balance between two areas of support: Caesar’s support base of plebeians, soldiers, and veterans, and the conspirators’ allies in the senate. He had granted amnesty to the assassins to prevent civil war and given in to many of the senate’s demands, which kept that faction placated and less willing to take action against him. Antony had portrayed himself as the legitimate continuation of Caesar’s legacy to the Caesarian supporters, since he was the dictator’s lieutenant. This balance allowed Antony to remain safe while consolidating his own power, but once Octavian disrupted this and pulled supporters away from Antony, the consul was forced to move more quickly and aggressively to maintain power among Caesarian supporters[1].

Antony Cornered on Both Sides

Antony’s rhetoric became critical of the assassins, which alienated the senate[2]. At this time, Octavian’s faction was continuing to use generous bribes and propaganda to form a technically illegal army comprised of Caesar’s veterans[3]. To protect himself from Octavian, Antony used what popularity he had left to pass a bill through the people’s assembly—circumventing senatorial objections—that appropriated two strategic items to improve his position: first, the army from the province of Macedonia, and second, the province of Cisalpine Gaul[4].

Map indicating the location of the Roman province Cisalpine Gaul.

This province, located at the entrance of the Italian peninsula, was the one closest to Rome itself; therefore, it offered a powerful tactical advantage to whomever controlled it. Caesar has previously used the province to great effect during his own rise to power[5]. Cisalpine Gaul, however, was under the control of Decimus Brutus, an ally of the senate and one of the conspirators; as a result, the senatorial faction and the assassins felt even more threatened by Antony’s actions[6].

As Antony moved the Macedonian legions to Italy, Octavian sent agents into the army camps and used propaganda—similar to the propaganda already explained—against the consul[7]. During this time, two of Antony’s legions defected and decided to support Octavian[8]. Increasingly threatened, Antony moved to capture Cisalpine Gaul from Decimus Brutus, infuriating the senate and leading to a complete breakdown of the consul’s temporary truce with that faction[9].

All this resulted from Octavian’s political actions that threatened Antony and forced him to protect himself and maintain Caesarian support by acting in a more extreme fashion. That turned the ire of the senate against the consul, thus creating a pincer effect as Antony was attacked politically by Octavian on one side and by the senate on another. In this way, Octavian’s political maneuvers placed his political enemy, Antony, into a difficult position.


[1] Appian BCiv III.33-8 and Dio XLV.9.1. See also Everitt 60-2 and Syme 115, 119.

[2] Syme 123.

[3] Appian BCiv III.40. See also Cary and Scullard 285, Everitt 66-8, and Syme 125.

[4] Appian BCiv III.25-7 and Syme 115.

[5] Everitt 61-2, Shotter 89, Syme 116.

[6] Appian BCiv III.27, 37.

[7] Appian BCiv III.31, 44 and Eveitt 63.

[8] Appian BCiv III.45 and Everitt 66.

[9] Appian BCiv III.46, Everitt 66-7, and Suet. Aug. 10.2. See also Cady and Scullard 285 and Syme 126-7.

Cisalpine Gaul Image: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:GALLIA_CISALPINA_SPQR_png.png

Antony Image: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MarkAntony1.jpg